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cumstances, moral and social obligations, human feeling (ninjo), friendship 
(yujo) and sincerity (magokoro). These factors are more important than the 
details of the agreement itself in ideal Japanese contractual relationships.17 
The volume of essays which Professor Henderson and his colleagues have 
produced is an extremely valuable contribution to the growing body of 
literature on Japanese law, a field well worth the careful study of American 
scholars. Due to the rapidity and intensity of contemporary Japanese in-
dustrial development in a severely limited geographic region, many problems 
are reaching critical intensity earlier than they have in North America. Conse-
quently, there are fields oflaw on Japan which provide valuable comparisons 
for us. Among them are environmental law , consumer protection, mass com-
munications and forensic medicine. IS Japanese constitutional law in the first 
twenty years of the new Constitution received a massive transplant from the 
West. It is quite possible that the West may now learn something valuable in 
return from a study of the developing constitutional theories and practices of 
the Japanese. 
17. This aspect of Japanese law has been very well presented in HENDERSON, CONCILIATION 
AND JAPANESE LAw (1965) and in a study by D. MITCHELL, AMAERU: THE ExPRESSION OF 
RECIPROCAL DEPENDENCY IN JAPANESE POLITICS AND LAw, (1976). 
18. See Masami, Postwar Japa1U1se Law and Legal Studies, 7 THE JAPAN FOUNDATION NEWSLET· 
TER (1979). 
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Almost twelve years elapsed between the conclusion of the Kennedy Round 
of trade negotiations and the tentative conclusion of the Tokyo Round in the 
spring of 1979. I This was the longest period devoid of visible accomplishments 
·Imanuel Wexler, currently Visiting Professor at Tilburg University (The Netherlands), is 
Professor of Economics at the University of Connecticut. He is the author of FUNDAMENTALS OF 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (1972), and of articles and reviews in professional journals. He is 
presently completing a book on the Marshall Plan. 
1. It is so named because its intiation had been decided upon during a ministerial meeting 
which took place in Tokyo, September, 1973. 
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in the area oftrade liberalization in the thirty-two year history of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 2 It was also a period marked by 
profound and unsettling changes in international economic relationships, as 
well as in the underlying assumptions and attitudes upon which they had been 
based. 
The deterioration of the U.S. balance-of-payments during the sixties, which 
led eventually to the suspension of the dollar's convertibility into gold on 
August 15, 1971,' spelled an end to the relative stability of the Bretton Woods 
system. Fixed exchange rates soon gave way to regimes of floating rates, 
characterized by recurrent movements of funds from one currency (especially 
the dollar) to another. Successive attempts to reform the international 
monetary system failed to produce permanent solutions.· Periodic North-
South dialogues - or, more correctly, confrontations - proved hardly more 
successful in producing lasting agreements on trade and foreign aid issues. 
Continuing changes in comparative costs and relative prices brought about 
significant changes in trade patterns, especially betwen developed and 
developing nations; but readjustments to such changes were rendered all the 
more difficult as. national authorities struggled to cope with an alternating 
sequence of inflations and recessions. Growing energy demands coupled with 
OPEC's price and supply policies served to aggravate trade deficits and inten-
sify domestic economic problems in many countries. 
In light of these developments, it is not surprising that the calls for a new in-
ternational economic order in the sixties have become muted by stop-gap ef-
forts to patch up the existing regime. Nor is it surprising that the very notion 
of global economic interdependence - with its implied commitment to the 
progressive elimination of trade barriers - has been increasingly challenged 
in recent years. This change in attitude manifests itself in various ways, rang-
ing from opposition to further reductions of existing tariffs to outright 
demands for increased protection. As if to demonstrate its own grave con-
cerns, the U.S. Congress took a long time before responding to the Ad-
ministration's repeated requests for renewed trade-negotiating authority. 
Only in late December 1974, seven and a half years after the previous 
authorization had expired, did Congress finally enact the necessary legislation 
in the form of the Trade Act of 1974. 6 Although the Act empowered the Presi-
dent to enter into trade agreements with foreign countries during a five year 
2. October 30, 1947,61 Stat. pt. 5, at All, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1950). 
GATT is a multilateral agreement governing national action in trade policy matters. 
3. See 33 INT'L FINANCIAL NEWS SURVEY 261 (1971); Press Conference of Secretary Conno.lly, N.Y. 
Times, Aug. 17, 1971, at 6, col. 1. 
4. See generally IV A. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THE INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY SYSTEM (1977). 
5. See M. BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, (1978). 
6. 88 Stat. 1978 (1974), Pub. L. 93-618 (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.). 
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period, it set a definite limit on his tariff-cutting authority.11t also stipulated 
that any negotiated agreements involving reductions in, or elimination of non-
tariff barriers would have to be specifically approved by Congress. 8 Thus, 
while granting the United States the authority to participate in the Tokyo 
Round, Congress retained for itself the prerogative of passing judgment on 
some of its prospective results. 
It is against this background that the two volumes under consideration 
should be analyzed. Both address themselves to essentially the same subject: 
the pursuit of commercial policy within a context of a changing international 
economic climate. Both studies take as their point of departure the remarkable 
economic growth and trade expansion achieved since the end of World War 
II. Both works attribute these achievements to the substantial reductions in 
tariffs which were accomplished through successive rounds of multilateral 
trade negotiations under GATT's auspicies. 9 Both volumes deplore the recent 
resurgence of protectionist tendencies and assert that the economic benefits to 
be derived from further trade liberalization would far outweigh any economic 
costs which might be associated with the removal of protective measures. 
However, it is here that similarities end, and differences begin. 
In what may best be described as a general statement of beliefs, the authors 
of Trade Liberalization, Protectionism and Interdependence set out to explore the im-
plications of various trade policies for global economic welfare and growth. 
Their narrative is largely non-technical though it does draw heavily on 
theoretical studies and various official documents. It consists of three main 
parts: (1) a brief explanation of long-term trends in production and trade 
following World War II; (2) a fairly detailed examination of the argument for 
further trade liberalization; and (3) an equally detailed analysis of the causes 
and consequences of current protectionist trends. However, there is one theme 
that permeates the entire discussion - trade liberalization is preferable to pro-
tectionism under almost any conceivable circumstance. 
This is not to suggest that the authors are oblivious to existing realities in 
endorsing freer trade and rejecting protection. They do not ignore the various 
economic and political considerations that are bound to influence the direction 
7. The Act allows a maximum cut of 60 % in all existing tariffs above 5 %, and the complete 
elimination of tariffs of 5 % and below. [This perogative is hereinafter referred to as the "full 
U. S. authority".) 
8. It might be noted here that "nontariff barriers" refer to a variety of measures which serve 
to discriminate against foreign producers and accord a margin of preference (or protection) to 
domestic suppliers. Among such measures are: import quotas, subsidies, discriminatory govern-
mental procurement policies, complex customs valuation procedures, variable levies on 
argicultural imports, usually stiff product standards applicable to imports, etc. 
9. Six previous rounds of multilateral trade negotiations have taken place between GATT con· 
tracting parties. These rounds have been labelled as follows: Geneva Round, 1947; Annecy 
Round, 1949; Torquay Round, 1950; Japanese Accession to the GATT, 1955; Dillon Round, 
1959; and Kennedy Round, 1964. See generalry UNITED STATES TARIFF COMMISSION, TRADE BAR· 
RIERS (1974). 
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of national commercial policies. For example, they correctly recognize that 
much of the resistence to further reductions of trade barriers stems from a con-
cern about the potential effect of trade liberalization on domestic income 
distribution and on internal economic stability. 10 They are also correct in in-
terpreting contemporary protectionism as "a refusal [on the part of individual 
countries] to carry out the adjustments [necessitated] by the continuing 
change in global supply-demand patterns. "11 They are acutely aware that, in 
a political sense, protectionism is in response to specific demands by well-
organized domestic interest groups to protect particular national industries 
against foreign competition. 12 Nonetheless, the basic presumption is in favor 
of trade liberalization, and the main purpose of this slim volume is to gather 
and present the evidence with which to support its case. 
To the specialist, the analysis should be quite familiar. All the standard 
economic arguments for free trade and international specialization are duti-
fully reiterated: the gains to consumers through lower-priced goods; the gains 
to production through the displacement of high-cost industries and the effi-
cient allocation of resources; the gains resulting from economies of scale; the 
gains due to greater competition; and the contributions of free trade to 
domestic price stability and the control of inflation. 13 The authors then pro-
ceed to examine several arguments against trade liberalization and refute 
them one by one. a Briefly, two main tests appear to constitute the basis for 
judgment: (1) are the possible losses of some groups, due to trade liberaliza-
tion, outweighed by larger gains to society as a whole?; and (2) is a restrictive 
commercial policy the most effective (or efficient) means of solving legitimate 
domestic economic problems? As may be surmised, the application of these 
tests results in an affirmative answer to the first, and a resounding negative 
one to the second. 
While the case for free trade is stated in a straightforward and unequivocal 
manner, the succeeding analysis, entitled 'The Economics and Politics of Pro-
tectionism', is much less organized and sure-footed. The discourse, which 
begins on a pessimistic note, ends with a plea to governments "to help the 
public, through an informed discussion, to understand the full consequences 
of different lines of collective action. "15 These "lines of action" are never fully 
described although judging from the preceding discussion, the authors are ob-
viously referring to the formulation and implementation of various domestic 
and international policies. However, the authors' conviction that much of the 
10. R. BLOCKHURST, N. MARIAN, & J. TUMLIR, TRADE LIBERALIZATION, PROTECTIONISM 
AND INDEPENDENCE, 30, 34 (1977). 
11. /d. at 43. 
12. /d. at 43, 52. 
13. Set id. at 23-9. 
14. The details of this particular exercise need not be recounted here . For these details Stt id. at 
30-41. 
15. /d. at 43. 
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blame for present economic difficulties and uncertainties lies with the" spread 
of the new protectionism" is quite clear. To overcome these difficulties, 
governments are responsible for the creation of "a stable framework of rules 
and policies" guided by "general and mutually compatible principles." 16 Pro-
tectionism, as a policy option, has no place in such a framework. On the con-
trary, "it exploits and fosters a misconception of a society's internal and exter-
nal interests . . . and feeds on a misunderstanding of the true consequences of 
the different policies by which governments try to secure these interests." 17 
That is the ultimate conclusion of the GATT's study. 
A much more precise and illuminating set of conclusions is offered by the 
authors of Trade Negotiations in the Tokyo Round: A Quantitative Assessment. They, 
too, acknowledge and lament the presence and constraining influence of pro-
tectionist pressures. However, their attention is focused on the actual process 
of negotiations in the Tokyo Round and the potential impact of its outcome. 
The Tokyo Round (1974-1979) has been the longest and most complex ses-
sion of multilateral trade negotiations since World War II, involving ninety-
nine countries and dealing with many aspects of international economic 
policies. Apart from providing for bargaining over tariff reductions, this 
round of negotiations represented the first comprehensive attempt to come to 
grips with the proliferation and growing use of nontariff barriers. In addition, 
it explicitly addressed a number of outstanding issues which have long gov-
erned trade relations between developed and developing nations. At its con-
clusion, the Tokyo Round had produced an impressive package of results: A 
pledge by the industrial countries to reduce tariffs by an average of 33% on 
some 5,700 internationally-traded items over an eight-year period; the adop-
tion of six new "codes" to govern and control the use of nontariff barriers; 
and the adaptation of several of GAIT's rules to changing international cir-
cumstances particularly to the special interests of the developing nations. 
However, this package had not been released when the Brookings study 
went into press and its exact contents remained unknown for another year or 
so after its publication. Therefore, the analysis is an economic assessment of 
the Tokyo Round, based not on the actual outcome of the negotiations but 
rather on a series of alternative assumptions as to the possible outcomes. 
Nevertheless, the study offers an objective and realistic insight into the major 
issues that dominated the negotiations and furnishes useful analytical tools by 
which the eventual results will be tested. IS 
No summary could possibly do justice to the wealth of information and 
detail contained in this volume. The nature and scope of the study can perhaps 
16. /d. at 59. 
17. /d. at 60. 
18. For details of the analytical model developed see W.R. CLINE, N. KAWANABEE, T. O. 
KRONSjO & T. WILLIAMS, TRADE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE TOKYO ROUND, ch. 2 (1977). 
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be appreciated by noting that its authors have undertaken to calculate four sets 
of trade liberalization effects. These four sets are: 1) change in trade flows; 2) 
welfare benefits; 3) employment effects; and 4) trade balance effects for each of 
twelve tariff-cutting formulas corresponding to the principal types of formulas 
proposed and considered during the course of the negotiations. 19 They also 
calculated similar effects which are attributable to the lowering of nontariffbar-
riers to argicultural trade20 and updated previous estimates of expected in-
creases in trade due to the liberalization of governmental procurement 
policies. 21 Finally, the authors present a series of estimates detailing the pro-
spective effects of trade concessions exchanged among the industrial countries 
on the exports of the developing nations.22 
While none of the major aspects of the Tokyo Round has escaped the quan-
titative scrutiny of the investigations, the main preoccupation is centered on 
the economic implementations of trade liberalization for the industrial world. 
Accordingly, the bulk of the empirical results, as well as the massive data used 
in calculating them, pertain to eleven geographical tariff areas. These areas 
are comprised of nineteen countries: the United States, Canada, Japan, 
Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Australia, New Zealand, 
and the nine-member European Economic Community (EEC). 
The aggregate results of this study suggest that the reduction of existing 
tariffs could lead to net increases in the industrial countries' imports ranging 
from $5.4 billion to $17 billion. Such increases could in turn, produce a total 
welfare gain amounting to as much as $170 billion. 23 Measured against these 
benefits the potential costs appear to be minimal. Even under the most liberal 
tariff-cutting formula which could be adopted in practice, the gross displace-
ment of jobs due to tariff reductions is estimated to be less than .02% of the 
total labor force in the United States and the EEC, .05%, in Japan, and 
.09%, in Canada. 2. Similarly, a 60% cut in the tariff-equivalent of 
agricultural nontariff barriers would be expected to yield an annual welfare 
gain of over $2 billion while causing relatively small job losses: about 1 % to 
19. These fonnulas represent different average depths of tariff cuts, defined as the change in 
tariff as a percentage of the pre-negotiation tariff. They range from a 100% cut - i.e., complete 
elimination - to cuts averaging around 20%. On the basis of these cuts, an estimate can be 
made of the resulting trade flows, etc. For detailed description of the formulas, see id., ch. 3 and 
app. A. 
20. Id. at chs. 4 and 5. 
2!' Id. at ch. 6. 
22. Id. at ch. 7. 
23. See id. at 78, 230. These estimates, which exclude petroleum and textile imports, are based 
on 1974 data. The $17 billion increase could be achieved only as a result of 100% cut in tariffs. 
Tariff cuts under full U. S. authority would yeild an increase of about $11 billion. For the basis of 
estimating the welfare effect. Id. at 139. . 
24. See id. at 232. The adjustment cost incurred by the transitional unemployment oflabor in 
the United States is estimated by the authors at $600 million or eighty times smaller than the ex-
pected welfare gain valued at $50 billion. 
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3 % of total labor in Japan and .33 % of the labor force in the EEC. 25 If the 
degree of protection presently afforded by discriminatory governmental pro-
curement policies was also reduced by 60%, the resulting increases in trade 
could amount to over $1 billion. 26 
Equally significant are the potential benefits that may be reaped by the less 
developed countries (LDC's) as a result of the Tokyo Round negotiations. 
The authors estimate that tariff cuts, if carried to the maximum allowed under 
the full U.S. authority, would raise the LDC's exports by $2.6 billion annual-
ly while a 60% cut in the tariff-equivalent protection of argicultural nontariff 
barriers would add another $468 million to their annual export earningsY It 
should be noted that textile trade, which is currently restricted by both tariffs 
and voluntary export quotas, has been excluded from these projections. Given 
the prevailing attitude of domestic textile manufacturers, especially in the 
United States, the authors correctly conclude that the existing system of vol un-
tary export controls would not be dismantled during the negotiations in 
Geneva. Under the circumstances, tariff cuts alone would not provide a 
reliable measure of prospective textile exports expansion. Nonetheless, the 
authors comment that reductions of tariffs on textiles - if accompanied by the 
removal of quantitative import and export restrictions - could well result in 
an additional annual increase of $2.3 billion in LDC's textile exports. 28 The 
total of these potential export gains could raise the annual (non oil) export 
earnings of the less developed countries by approximately 6 % above their 
19741evel.29 
In conclusion, the confirmed proponent of free trade would undoubtedly 
find a great deal of comfort in the empirical results, and would heartily en-
dorse the authors' contention that "relatively deep cuts in tariffs and nontariff 
barriers, such as thefull u.s. authon·ty, could provide important welfare gains to 
consumers in industrial countries as well as important export gains to develop-
ing countries. "30 However, viewing the final outcome of the Tokyo Round, 
the only relevant set of estimates appears to be the one associated with the 
tariff-cutting formula which is calculated to yield an average cut of 33 %. That 
particular formula, according to the study's estimates, is expected to produce 
a $5.7 billion increase in the industrial countries' imports; a total welfare gain 
of almost $140 billion; and an annual increase of $1.4 billion in the LDC' s ex-
portS. 31 How accurate these estimates will turn out to be remains to be seen. 
25. Ste id. at 187, 235. The most significant welfare gains are expected to accrue to the EEC 
and Japan. 
26. !d. at 235. 
27. [d. at 226. 
28. [d. at 210. This is predicated upon the assumption that the tariff cuts are based on the "fulI 
United States authority." 
29. !d. at 236. 
30. !d. (italics added). 
31. !d. at 78, 211. The employment effect associated with this tariff reduction is miniscule. 
